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RETHINKING DUI LAW IN VIRGINIA
Monte Kuligowski *
I. INTRODUCTION
Prosecuting the crime of driving under the influence ("DUI") (or
driving with a blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") level of at least
0.08)1 without doing damage to some of our most cherished con-
stitutional principles is oftentimes problematic. To narrow the fo-
cus of that wide vein, failing to always require the requisite
criminal intent for conviction is the primary consideration of this
essay.2
The crime of DUI is an intense emotional, political, and consti-
tutional subject. On one side of the debate, we have organized
lobby groups, most notably Mothers Against Drunk Driving, that
push for ever-harsher drunk driving laws. On the other side, we
have the defense bar and those concerned with sacrificing the
Constitution in exchange for easier DUI convictions.
Those having lost loved ones at the hands of drunk drivers and
those who are simply concerned about the safety of the roadways
have every reason to demand stricter drunk driving laws. And
• Practitioner, Monte E. Kuligowski, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia; J.D., 1996, Re-
gent Law School.
1. Virginia Code section 18.2-266 also may be violated by driving under the influence
of prescription and non-prescription drugs, but the vast majority of cases are alcohol re-
lated. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
2. The adverbs "willfully," "intentionally," and/or "recklessly" are conspicuously ab-
sent in section 18.2-266, which reads like a simple traffic infraction: "It shall be unlawful
for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle ... while such person is under the in-
fluence of alcohol." Id. In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994),
the Supreme Court of the United States held that "some form of scienter is to be implied in
a criminal statute even if not expressed, and ... a statute is to be construed where fairly
possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions." The word "scienter" is syn-
onymous with mens rea, meaning culpable state of mind or criminal knowledge. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004). Unfortunately, the traffic courts routinely
overlook the essential element of criminal intent.
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those who are able to foresee the legal consequences of replacing
constitutional protections with quid pro quo measures for the
sake of appeasing loud voices have every reason to demand con-
stitutional integrity from the legislature and judiciary.
My position is that the two seemingly polar groups are not
natural enemies, and my proposals at the end of this piece seek to
satisfy the concerns of both sides. I argue the solution is to enact
appropriate criminal driving laws that satisfy both societal and
constitutional concerns.
As the demand for safer roadways needs little supporting ar-
gument, I turn to the constitutional problem of strict criminal li-
ability law, followed with a brief analysis of criminal intent and
strict liability law within the criminal system, some examples of
how other states have responded to the inherent tensions, and a
few specific thoughts for the legislature to consider.
II. CONTEXT OF ANALYSIS
Strict liability law in "criminal form" expanded immensely in
the early twentieth century. Scholars credit the advent of the in-
dustrial revolution (whereby the operation of modern machinery
presents a ubiquitous danger to the public) for the increase of hy-
brid strict civil liability cases prosecuted by the state. In 1915,
Justice Cardozo noted, "Prosecutions for petty penalties have al-
ways constituted in our law a class by themselves. That is true,
though the prosecution is criminal in form."3 When Justice Car-
dozo spoke of "petty penalties," he referred exclusively to mone-
tary penalties for offenses committed with negligence. A bar-
tender who continues to serve alcohol to an observably impaired
patron is an example of such an offense. Traditional strict civil li-
ability law that requires a standard of care owed to an individual
also requires a standard of care owed to the public at large: "In
the interest of the larger good [a strict liability offense] puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but
standing in responsible relation to a public danger."4
3. Tenement House Dep't v. McDevitt, 109 N.E. 88, 90 (N.Y. 1915) (citations omit-
ted).
4. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
[Vol. 42:107
RETHINKING DUI LAW IN VIRGINIA
Fast-forwarding to contemporary criminal jurisprudence, we
now encounter substantive, jailable criminal offenses that hinge
on strict liability, requiring no cuipable intention or finding of
recklessness. The existence of substantive criminal offenses by
strict liability is largely the result of the increasing number of
hybrid offenses coupled with the misinterpretation of an infa-
mous 1952 Supreme Court case.
Virginia courts and the appellate courts of other states casually
cite Morissette v. United States5 to justify the enforcement of their
substantive strict liability criminal offenses. A review of the case
reveals that the justification is pressed out of the Court's dictum,
and, interestingly, the holding of Morissette does not help the
substantive strict-criminal-liability cause. The holding is that a
criminal conviction (on the code section before the Court, though
partially silent regarding intent) will not be upheld without the
age-old element of mens rea.6 The Supreme Court thus reversed
the holding of the court of appeals that criminal intent need not
be established when it appears that the legislature intended to
create a strict liability criminal offense.7
In his well-written opinion, Justice Jackson expounds on the
history and distinctions between strict liability and mens rea of-
fenses. He makes it clear that the requirement of criminal intent
is "no provincial or transient notion."' Moreover, the requirement
of mens rea "is as universal and persistent in mature systems of
law as belief in freedom of the human will ... and took deep and
early root in American soil."9 On the other hand, the opinion con-
tains language that seemingly leaves the question of criminal in-
tent to the unbridled discretion of the legislature:
Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has under-
taken to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria
for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and
crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law on
the subject is neither settled nor static. 10
5. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
6. Id. at 263.
7. See Morissette v. United States, 187 F.2d 427, 429 (6th Cir. 1951).
8. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
9. Id. at 250-52.
10. Id. at 260.
20071
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Additionally, the Court cites United States v. Balint, which ap-
pears to make criminal intent "a question of legislative intent to
be construed by the court."1
Though the issue in Balint appears to involve violations of seri-
ous criminal offenses because the defendants were indicted under
the 1914 "Narcotic Act" for unlawfully selling derivative opium
and coca leaves,12 the "crimes" at issue were actually violations of
a regulatory offense punishable by monetary penalty. Thankfully,
the Balint Court clarified the context where a legislative intent to
not require criminal intent properly lies: "Many instances of [leg-
islative intent] are to be found in regulatory measures in the ex-
ercise of what is called the police power where the emphasis of
the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social better-
ment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of
mala in se.""
Though the Court in Morissette was unwilling to draw a precise
line between public welfare offenses and mala in se crimes, it
does not follow that if the legislature intends to dispense of
criminal intent in the drafting of a criminal offense, the enact-
ment is constitutionally sound. The Court's unwillingness to dic-
tate to the states the offenses that may be enforced without mens
rea and those requiring criminal intent for conviction does not
mean that criminal statutes are subject to the Constitution except
when criminal intent is the issue. Indeed, the exposition of Moris-
sette is consistent with the common law and the Constitution and
may be summed up as follows: Under our criminal justice system,
mala in se crimes without some form of mens rea cannot exist. 14
Likewise, strict liability offenses are not punishable by impris-
onment.
A review of Justice Cardozo's words quoted in Morissette re-
veals the Court's guarded position on the question of mens rea:
Judge Cardozo ... pointed out, as a basis for penalizing violations
whether intentional or not, that they were punishable only by fine
"moderate in amount," but cautiously added that in sustaining the
power so to fine unintended violations "we are not to be understood
as sustaining to a like length the power to imprison."15
11. Id. at 250; United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
12. Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
13. Id. at 252.
14. See supra note 2.
15. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 257-58 (quoting People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-
[Vol. 42:107
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Though the Virginia appellate courts have not addressed the
criminal intent issue in the "driving under the influence" statute,
the Supreme Court of Virginia boldly proclaims, in general, that
"the legislature may create strict liability offenses as it sees fit,
and there is no constitutional requirement that an offense contain
a mens rea or scienter element."6 That kind of erroneous pro-
nouncement is not limited to Virginia. The states reaching simi-
lar conclusions share a misreading of Morissette and a failure to
distinguish between the types of laws that require the element of
mens rea. The distinction, for purposes of criminal intent, does
not lie between common-law offenses and contemporary statutory
offenses. The enduring doctrine of mens rea is blind to whether a
jailable offense was codified years ago from non-statutory com-
mon law or recently created by statute.
Practically speaking, no one who argues for DUI to be classified
as a strict criminal liability offense believes that it is a malum
prohibitum or regulatory offense. Indeed, both sides of the debate
agree that drunk driving is a crime of inherent criminal wrongdo-
ing that should, at times, be punished by pain of imprisonment.
The current state of DUI jurisprudence, with its unconstitu-
tional presumptions, lax evidentiary standards, and strict crimi-
nal liability either by pronouncement or inference, is the result of
starting from the wrong premise. To have any reasonable hope of
arriving at sound proposals, this essay is written from the stand-
point that a criminal offense requires criminal intent. Beginning
elsewhere would be to "radically... change the weights and bal-
ances in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious effect of
doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the
prosecution's path to conviction .... ",1
Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. 474, 476-77 (N.Y. 1918)).
16. Esteban v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 605, 609, 587 S.E.2d 523, 526 (2003) (citing
Maye v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 48, 49, 189 S.E.2d 350, 351 (1972)); see Morissette, 342
U.S. at 256-58. Contrary to the court's ruling in Esteban, in the criminal law context, a
constitutional requirement of mens reas does exist. The imperative of X-Citement Video,
see supra note 2, requiring scienter of some form to be implied in criminal statutes was
completely ignored by the Esteban Court. Moreover, reliance upon Morissette and Maye to
displace hundreds of years of common law is misplaced. Maye merely stands for the propo-
sition that statutes that are silent with respect to mens rea are not per se unconstitutional
"since such requirement will be read into the statute by the court when it appears the leg-
islature implicitly intended that it must be proved." Maye, 213 Va. at 49, 189 S.E.2d at
351. No sound constitutional doctrine suggests that the legislature can arbitrarily make
mens rea irrelevant in criminal statutes.
17. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.
20071
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III. THE PROBLEM OF CRIMINAL INTENT
Proving a defendant's mens rea in the area of drinking and
driving law is not always a black and white matter. The judici-
ary's automated application of the M'Naghten Rule-that an ac-
cused is deemed to have foresight relating to the consequences of
his actions-works fine when the accused engages in heavy drink-
ing and then recklessly proceeds to drive an automobile. But in
cases where the drinking is moderate and evidence of reckless-
ness is absent, criminal intent should not be presumed instinc-
tively. So long as it remains legal to drive after drinking (as long
as one is not under the influence or at a BAC of 0.08), a judgment
call must be made by the person intending to drive. Someone who
is not appreciably impaired would not necessarily foresee nega-
tive consequences in driving any more than one would foresee
negative consequences in driving while negligibly impaired by
other factors, such as fatigue.
In some circumstances (when BAC level is rising) a judgment
call is made after driving has commenced. One of the clearest in-
dications of the judiciary's willingness to overlook the element of
criminal intent (or to tacitly impute intent) to sustain DUI con-
victions may be observed in the development of the law with re-
spect to the "operation of a motor vehicle."'" Situations sometimes
arise where a driver deems herself unimpaired and fine to drive,
but, due to alcohol absorption, decides at some point to pull over
and park to prevent driving while impaired. One might think that
such decisions (to cease driving) should be commended as being in
the public interest. One might think that a criminal intent to
commit a crime could not be inferred from those facts. The rulings
of the Virginia appellate courts, however, would indicate other-
wise. Our hypothetical driver must be careful not to park her ve-
hicle at a place that is deemed a "highway."19 For, if after calling
18. Under Virginia Code section 18.2-266, it is "unlawful" to "drive or operate any mo-
tor vehicle" while under the influence of alcohol. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cur. Supp.
2006). The state of the law is such that if the "driver" activates or engages the vehicle's
mechanical devices, (including the ignition and brake lights) regardless of whether the en-
gine is running, he likely will be found to be operating the vehicle, so long as he is in close
enough proximity to exercise control. See Gravely v. Commonwealth, No. 0430-02-3, 2003
Va. App. LEXIS 19, at *7-9 (Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (unpublished opinion); Keesee v.
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 263, 527 S.E.2d 473 (Ct. App. 2000); Propst v. Common-
wealth, 24 Va. App. 791, 485 S.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1997).
19. The "implied consent law" means that anyone who drives on a "highway" consents
to having his breath tested and blood drawn when probable cause for DUI exists. See VA.
[Vol. 42:107
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for a ride, she waits in the driver's seat with the radio on and the
engine off, she might be engaging in "drunk driving." While the
suspect is "operating the vehicle" on a highway, even in her sleep,
the rise in her BAC may be used against her to sustain a convic-
tion. Regardless of the counter-intuitiveness of finding criminal
intent in such circumstances, convictions of the sort are upheld in
Virginia.2"
In order to violate a criminal law, the intent to do something or
to omit something against the law must be present; intent is the
gravamen of our criminal justice system.21 When one intention-
ally acts, the mens rea attaches and if the specific commission or
omission happens to be illegal, barring legal excuse or justifica-
tion, the law is violated. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Even if
I claim to not know that stealing is wrong and I walk into a 7-
Eleven, place a candy bar in my pocket, walk out of the store
without paying for it, and eat the confection while walking home,
I have broken the law.
In contemporary criminal driving jurisprudence (and in other
areas of modern criminal law) we may observe the increasing
tendency of allowing strict liability to morph into intent.22 Acting
recklessly with a conscious disregard for others has always been
enough to supply the requisite criminal intent for conviction of a
CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2 (Cum. Supp. 2006); see also Furman v. Call, 234 Va. 437, 440-41,
362 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1987) (holding that an office condominium parking lot was a "high-
way"); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 27, 34, 492 S.E.2d 839, 842 (Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that a private roadway was indeed a highway for implied consent purposes).
20. In Floyd v. Commonwealth, the defendant was found to have operated a motor ve-
hicle after following the instruction of a police office who asked her to try to start the dis-
abled vehicle. See No. 0568-01-2, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 440, at *2-3 (Ct. App. July 30,
2002) (unpublished decision). Other than her attempt to start the vehicle (which did not
start), no evidence existed to show the defendant had operated the vehicle. Although coun-
sel for the defendant argued that Floyd did not operate the vehicle by merely attempting
to start it, no argument was raised concerning the apparent lack of criminal intent to
drive (or operate) under the influence in the context of Floyd's compliance with the officer's
request.
21. In Morissette, the Supreme Court noted:
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments
were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission [of crimi-
nal intent] did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized
that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no
statutory affirmation.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
22. Practically, of course, contemporary jurisprudence simply replaces the require-
ment of a culpable intent for absolute criminal liability.
2007]
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jailable offense.23 Certainly, criminal intent may be inferred from
reckless behavior, but recklessness should never be inferred from
strict liability law.
If while driving on a Virginia highway my speedometer needle
reaches 75 in a 55 mph zone, I may be found guilty of a class one
misdemeanor and permissibly sentenced to twelve months in jail.
It is reckless driving without the city or state having to prove ac-
tual recklessness.24 Let's say I truly did not know my needle
reached 75. Let's say I knew I was in violation of the strict liabil-
ity traffic regulation of speeding but had no idea that my speed
reached 75 for a brief moment, thus making my actions crimi-
nal.25 Let's say my eyes were on the road and there were no cars
(other than the hidden police cruiser) within two miles. After see-
ing the blue lights, I looked down and saw my speed at 70.
This is quite distinguishable from the 7-Eleven hypothetical.
By merely egressing the store's threshold without paying for the
item, a bit of intent may be inferred-that of intending to perma-
nently deprive the store of the candy bar. But critically important
23. Whether labeled as criminal negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness, the
terms must involve an "act done willfully ... the known effect of which, under the circum-
stances, must be to endanger life [or to break the specific law]." United States v. Freeman,
25 F. Cas. 1208, 1211 (C.C.D. Mass. 1827) (No. 15,162). The key words are "the known ef-
fect." As Justice Holmes stated, "[A] deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence
unless that consequence is the aim of the deed." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Court in Morissette notes:
The unanimity with which [the states] have adhered to the central thought
that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the vari-
ety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive
mental element. However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the pur-
poses of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific
ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious intent,"
'criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge," "fraudulent in-
tent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to
signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
24. Virginia Code section 46.2-862 states, in relevant part: "A person shall be guilty of
reckless driving who drives a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth (i) at a
speed of twenty miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit
.... " VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-862 (Supp. 2006). Incidentally, section 46.2-852 states: "Irre-
spective of the maximum speeds permitted by law, any person who drives a vehicle on any
highway recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or prop-
erty of any person shall be guilty of reckless driving." VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-862 (Repl. Vol.
2005).
25. Non-misdemeanor traffic infractions, of course, are strict liability offenses, not re-
quiring the element of criminal intent (i.e., not requiring that a defendant act "knowingly"
or "willfully" to be found guilty).
[Vol. 42:107
RETHINKING DUI LAW IN VIRGINIA
is the fact that I knew that I took the candy.2" That which is in-
ferred flows from the willful and intentional wrong act of taking
the candy.
So long as driving after drinking is not illegal, there are times
when I may drive after drinking without any knowledge of doing
something criminal. 27
It is not illegal to drink. It is not illegal to drive after drinking.
It is illegal to drive under the influence. It is illegal to drive when
your BAC is 0.08 or higher. In the context of committing and
proving the criminal offense, how does one always know when he
is either under the influence of alcohol or at a 0.08 BAC? And how
does the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
one drove with the requisite criminal intent when the suspect's
actions are accompanied with no evidence of recklessness (i.e.,
when the driving and mannerisms of the suspect prior to and af-
ter the traffic stop are otherwise unimpeachable)?
Say the suspect was pulled over for expired tags and regardless
of perfect driving and coherent and polite speech, the suspect
nevertheless "fails" the field tests and subsequently blows a 0.08.
Regarding intent in that scenario, strict liability bootstraps reck-
lessness, which provides the criminal intent. A criminal convic-
tion means that one is held to a standard of strict liability for
driving after drinking regardless of actual knowledge or reckless-
ness.
Or let us say that after some heavy drinking and riding home
as a passenger, a woman falls asleep at two o'clock in the morn-
ing. She wakes up at 7:00 a.m. feeling groggy, but with no impair-
ing effects of alcohol. She leaves her house and proceeds to drive
to the 7-Eleven to get a pack of cigarettes and a cup of coffee. Af-
ter pulling her over for speeding and detecting an odor of alcohol,
the officer asks whether she had been drinking and she answers
in the affirmative, explaining the circumstances. After failing
26. Some proponents of the current DUI system argue that one always "knows" when
one drives a motor vehicle and, therefore, the element of criminal intent is satisfied. The
distinction, of course, is that it is always illegal to take another's property without having
a legal interest, but it is not always illegal to drive an automobile; nor is it always illegal
to drive after drinking.
27. The subjectivity of being "under the influence" ought to be apparent when we re-
member that the legal presumption of being under the influence was once a BAC of 0.15,
then 0.10, and finally 0.08.
20071
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field sobriety tests, she is taken to the station where she refuses
the breath test. Based upon an officer's boilerplate testimony at
trial of the suspect being disheveled in appearance and unsteady
on her feet, having bloodshot eyes and a flushed face, coupled
with her inability to keep one leg in the air for the prescribed
time-period without dropping it or swaying, she realistically could
be convicted of DUI in Virginia without any indicia of criminal in-
tent or evidence of recklessness.
Though all constitutional protections should apply equally to
DUI cases, public policy, it seems, often trumps the Constitution
in the legislative halls and in the traffic tribunals. The law says it
is illegal to drive under the influence or with a BAC of 0.08 and
then sets out to yield to the policy of making convictions ever-
easier by ignoring the essential element of criminal intent (or
recklessness) and by relaxing evidentiary standards of proof.2"
Public policy effectively says that if you intend to drive after
drinking, you have the requisite intent to be found guilty of DUI
if it turns out that you cannot satisfactorily pass subjective field
sobriety tests or produce a breath reading under 0.08. In many
instances, strict liability indeed prevails substantively in our
criminal justice system.2 9
28. The federal government's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA") has spent thousands of dollars to develop "standardized" field sobriety tests
that purportedly yield a specific probability of intoxication percentage based upon a spe-
cific number of indicators and clues observed for each of the three approved tests. Even
granting that a foundation for field test reliability may be laid using the government re-
ports hearsay exception and that field sobriety testing research is admissible, judicial con-
clusions are routinely drawn without the necessary information offered into evidence from
the government's research. For example, arresting officers routinely provide the courts
with no more than a statement that certain tests were performed and how the accused
performed. For example, an officer might testify that he conducted the "walk and turn"
test and the suspect missed (making) heel to toe (contact) on steps three and seven and
raised his arms for balance on steps four and six. Without evidence of how the NHTSA
training manual requires the field officer to instruct the accused prior to commencing the
test; without evidence of the conditions, e.g., the lighting, age, weight, and/or health of the
suspect, required for reliability; without evidence of how many indicators of impairment
each test has; without evidence of how many clues are required for each test to trigger the
probable cause percentage number; and without evidence of what the probable cause per-
centage number is, the court is left entirely to speculation to connect the dots for probable
cause and, oftentimes, for conviction.
29. In Virginia, strict liability in the context of DUI prevails implicitly. The appellate
courts of some states have proclaimed that driving while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs is an "absolute liability" offense. See, e.g., City of Wichita v. Hull, 724 P.2d 699, 702
(Kan. Ct. App. 1986). The Kansas courts, unsurprisingly, rely upon Morissette to support
their rulings. In at least one context of Virginia DUI prosecution, the requirement of in-
tent is tacitly imputed to defendants rather than ignored. In federal prosecution of Vir-
[Vol. 42:107
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IV. STRICT LIABILITY'S PLACE IN CRIMINAL LAW
Strict liability has a place in criminal law, but it must always
be ancillary to a substantive crime. The earlier mentioned reck-
less driving by speed illustration is an example of just the oppo-
site-strict liability by speed alone, without actual knowledge, is
presently the substantive crime. To be constitutional, however,
the crime of reckless driving (with knowledge and recklessness)
must be proven first, and then the strict liability element of cer-
tain speeds (with or without actual knowledge) may enhance pun-
ishment.3" That is the constitutional scheme we see with the age-
old crime of larceny. The crime of larceny is committed by taking
an item with intent and the (strict liability) dollar value of the
item (with or without having knowledge of the item's value)
merely determines how the offense is classified (misdemeanor or
felony) and structured for punishment. The same reasoning
should apply to other strict liability crimes such as the crime of
consensual, statutory rape. Presently, the minor's age is imputed
to secure a conviction even if the accused reasonably believed that
the minor was nineteen. The solution for that strict liability evi-
dentiary dilemma is the same as with all others. The strict liabil-
ity element of age must be tied to a substantive crime, in this case
fornication.31 Strict liability then becomes ancillary to a substan-
tive, intent-based crime. The crime is committed regardless of age
and the age of the minor simply classifies the offense for purposes
of punishment.
In order to restore judicial integrity to the offense of DUI, the
constitutional scheme of due process must likewise be set in or-
der. The strict liability cart should not go before the substantive
ox of a mala in se criminal offense.
ginia Code section 18.2.266, the United States Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of
Virginia adds language of scienter in its "Criminal Information." The federal prosecutor
routinely charges that the accused did knowingly and unlawfully operate a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or at a BAC of at least 0.08.
30. Alternatively, the legislature could make it a crime to knowingly drive at seventy-
five miles per hour on the highway and call it something other than reckless driving.
31. Whether the Commonwealth generally prosecutes the crime of fornication is ir-
relevant. Once the law is amended to make age an element of ancillary strict liability, a
prosecutor's office could adopt the policy of prosecuting those types of fornication cases
that have minors as victims.
2007]
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V. THE TREND IN DRINKING AND DRIVING LAW
The State of Arizona attempted to solve some of the DUI prob-
lems by enacting legislation that makes it illegal for a driver to be
"impaired to the slightest degree" by alcohol or drugs.32 Colorado
law creates a "permissible inference that the defendant's ability
to operate a vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol
[when the defendant's BAC] was in excess of 0.05. . .""
With regard to the faulty presumption that the BAC test result
at the police station accurately reflects the actual BAC level when
the suspect was driving, Arizona, Colorado, and other states have
enacted legislation making it a crime to have a BAC level at a
0.08 while driving-or within two hours after driving.34 These so-
lutions may be ostensibly helpful, but when it comes to requiring
criminal intent for a criminal conviction they do not solve the
constitutional problems. The reasoning of the "impairment to the
slightest degree" law is that, before and during driving, one might
not know that he is unable to pass field and breathe tests, but he
ought to know when he is impaired to the slightest degree. The
problem, of course, is that alcohol affects people differently and
many times a suspect may not know that he is impaired by alco-
hol.3" Other reasons for impairment, like fatigue, illness, disease,
stress, emotion, or distractions, might reasonably form the sus-
pect's knowledge of his negligible deficiency.
With respect to making it illegal to produce a 0.08 BAC within
two hours after driving, the flawed presumption of relating the
BAC back to the driving time-frame is eliminated. Yet in refer-
ence to criminal intent, we may mark even more substantive
strict liability, not less.
32. See AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1381(A)(1) (2006).
33. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1301(6)(a)(II) (2006). Similar to Arizona, in Colorado
it is illegal to drive while ability impaired ("DWAI") and/or to drive under the influence
("DUI-). Id. § 42-4-1301(f), (g). A BAC of 0.08 gives rise to the "permissible inference" that
a defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Id. § 42-4-1301(6)(a)(III). Virginia Code
section 18.2-269 contains Virginia's presumptions. An accused having a BAC under 0.05 is
presumed to have not been under the influence; between 0.05 and 0.07 no presumption
exists either way; and at 0.08 the accused is presumed to have been under the influence.
The last presumption is irrelevant inasmuch as an accused is affirmatively in violation of
Code section 18.2-266 with a BAC of 0.08. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-269 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
34. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1381(A)(2); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1301
(2)(a).
35. Indeed, one person with a 0.08 BAC may be stumbling drunk while another's mo-
tor skills and cognitive abilities are not measurably influenced at the same alcohol level.
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VI. SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Rather than gravitating toward the Arizona and Colorado
models of ratcheting up the current system, and arguably making
convictions even more unconstitutional, a new system should be
implemented. The answer is not to continue to impute criminal
intent from strict liability (no matter how the law is packaged or
justified), nor to relax evidentiary burdens of proof. The tacit pol-
icy of substantive strict liability for driving after drinking when
those acts are not a per se crime will never find sound constitu-
tional approval.
To be intellectually honest and constitutionally faithful, either
driving after drinking needs to be criminalized or criminal intent
needs to be required for conviction of DUI.
A novel approach would be to criminalize driving after drink-
ing. One proposal would be for the creation of a new intent-based
offense of driving after drinking ("DAD") with other offenses by
ancillary strict liability-e.g., driving after drinking while under
the influence, etc. Like going from petty to grand larceny, the ad-
ditional elements would still have to be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, but the underlying element of criminal intent would
be established. Taking property with intent to deprive its owner
provides the mens rea for all larceny offenses and, likewise, the
intent to drive after drinking would provide the mens rea for all
DAD offenses.
The substantive offense of driving after drinking might best be
classified as a lower-grade misdemeanor. At the traffic stop or po-
lice encounter, admission of drinking by the driver or odor of al-
cohol (technically, the ingredients in the alcohol) detected by the
officer could trigger a mandatory Alco-Sensor unit field breath
test (currently the field test is voluntary).36 A reading of 0.08 or
36. The DAD statute might provide that it shall be unlawful to willfully drive an
automobile (within a specified time period) after consuming alcohol. A reading of 0.05 on
the officer's portable Alco-Sensor unit could create a rebuttable presumption that the sus-
pect drove within the proscribed time frame. Making the field breath test by the handheld
device mandatory would make probable cause arrest for DAD/DUI easier and more objec-
tive, circumventing the need for field sobriety tests. Even with all the due criticism of the
Intoxilyzer Model 5000 aside (e.g., the machine's assumption of the same breath tempera-
ture of all suspects, the machine's margin of error, etc.), field sobriety tests far exceed the
machine in subjectivity, especially in light of the fact that most DUI suspects are not
filmed at the roadside, which means the court relies solely on the officer's testimony for
probable cause and, many times, for conviction. The types of field tests used, instructions
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higher or other sufficient evidence could establish probable cause
for arrest for DAD/DUI; otherwise the suspect might receive a
summons for simple DAD. Under this proposed system, fewer
grey areas would exist with respect to criminal intent. Also, there
would be actual knowledge of drinking and subsequent driving.
Making driving after drinking illegal sounds like a simple solu-
tion, but some complex difficulties remain. First, although the
public apparently is in favor of ever-tougher DUI laws, I am not
sure that the citizenry is ready to make driving after drinking il-
legal. The proposal is wrought with practical problems, like being
unable to legally drive after dinner accompanied by a glass of
wine. Another potential problem, though highly exceptional,
would be a suspect who drives after the proscribed time period
but produces a BAC over the set minimum. In that instance,
criminal intent would seem to be absent. Even with that glitch in
the system, however, less criminal intent problems would arise
than with the current system.37
Alternatively, and perhaps preferably, the second proposal for
the criminal intent problem would be to simply require criminal
intent or evidence of recklessness for DUI convictions.38 Under
this proposal, the offense of DUI should be classified as a felony
(even for a first offense). If the public is willing to have an offense
on the books which carries a maximum sentence of twenty years
in prison for stealing an item that is worth $200.00,"9 certainly
the offense of willfully or recklessly driving while intoxicated
could, and perhaps should, be classified as a serious felony.
This second proposal would mean that accident-DUI-cases
caused by the fault of defendants under the influence would con-
to suspects, and evaluation of suspects' performance of sobriety testing certainly vary
among officers. What is detected as a strong odor of alcohol to one officer may be a moder-
ate odor to another. What appears to be a failed test to one officer may appear to be fine to
another. The breath machine at the station is at least objectively neutral, having no ap-
parent conflict of interest in needing to justify its probable-cause decision for arrest to the
court.
37. The offense of DAD could be classified as a strict liability traffic infraction (pun-
ishable by fine only), but the problem of criminal intent inevitably would arise when one
reaches the arbitrary BAC level, making the offense a criminal violation.
38. Language of intent should be added to the offense: e.g., 'It shall be unlawful for
anyone to willfully or recklessly drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
An alcohol concentration percentage of 0.08 shall constitute a presumption of being under
the influence. Violation of this section shall constitute a class [ I felony."
39. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007) (defining grand
larceny).
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stitute serious felony offenses.4" Drivers pulled over by the police
with evidence of reckless driving also would be charged with the
felony offense. Even when driving is not noticeably reckless, but a
suspect is grossly intoxicated to the point of lacking speech and
motor skills (incoherence and pronounced stumbling) at the traf-
fic stop, a finding of recklessness also would find evidentiary sup-
port. For those drivers stopped without sufficient evidence of in-
tent (lack of admission of feeling intoxicated or lack of testimony
from others having heard incriminating words of the suspect) or
recklessness, the law certainly could prevent further driving. A
strict liability regulation could say that suspects lawfully stopped
by the police who produce over a 0.05 BAC on the Alco-Sensor
would be prohibited from re-commencing driving.41 The vehicle
would have to be driven by someone else or impounded.
Of the two proposed systems, the second is the more legally and
practically sound, and both sides of the DUI debate may find sat-
isfaction under its constitutional ceiling (which would extend
quite high with regard to punishment). Drunk driving would be
discouraged by virtue of making the offense a felony. In the case
where a defendant is driving under the influence with criminal
intent or recklessness, she may be punished accordingly. By es-
tablishing the necessary mens rea, issues of imputing criminal in-
tent from strict liability would dissipate. The Arizona law of hold-
ing one liable for yielding a 0.08 BAC two hours after driving only
makes constitutional sense when mens rea already exists.
My advocacy is not for the above proposals; my concern is to see
the criminal justice system restored in the area of drinking and
driving. I realize that any number of proposals could work to re-
store the system. The legislature must determine the specifics.
The importance of the proposed reform lies not in the specifics,
however, but in honoring the overarching principles of our consti-
tutional system of criminal law.
40. Once mens rea is established by admission or recklessness, arbitrary BAC levels
could enhance punishment by strict liability.
41. The field Alco-Sensor test could become a mandatory test when an admission of
drinking or an odor of alcohol is detected. Without an admission (of feeling intoxicated or
drinking an excessive amount of alcohol) or evidence of recklessness to establish criminal
intent, instances could occur where drivers produce a reading over 0.08 on the Alco-Sensor
and are not charged, but are prohibited from further driving.
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